The main substantive results of the analysis know to have been implemented, the approach by Womack are the simulated effects of the four by James P. Houck and his colleagues at the buffer-stock alternatives; and the (Payment in University of Minnesota, would be quite inadKind) program of 1983 as compared to alterequate here. Also, export demand elasticities natives. These results are generally that reserve are quite low. Explanation is needed. programs with a reserve placement trigger well Most important is non-program stock demand. above the CCC loan rate, and coupled with above the CCC loan rate, and coupled with This seems to be treated simply as a demand acreage controls to support that price, give the component, represented by an elasticity of dehighest market price but lower stocks. The mand for stocks as a function of current price. "minimum" (pre-1977 Act) alternative gives h"minimum" (pre-1977 Act) alhtecrnativee gives But the level of stock demand will in general higher prices than the loan rate; acreage conbe sensitive to the public stock regime. That trols tend to keep price above the loan rate.
is, where we have government aquisition at the These qualitative results are sensible, but a simw w h g These qualitative results are sensible, but a simloan rate and release at 1.15 times the loan rate ulation model is not necessary to derive them.
(the "minimu" oti, expect to see very The 1983.84 PIK programanalysisgivessom (the "minimum" option), we expect to see very The 1983-84 PIK program analysis gives some little stockholding as long as the government interesting estimates of how much lower prices ls sig stocks (as we actually saw in during that period would have been if less this regime). But when the government sells acreage had been removed from production.
out, rite trers migt o e hold subThe aout, private traders might continue to hold subThe answer is a surprisingly small price effectstantial quantities (at prices above the release 14 million more acres, yields 20-25 percent stantial quantities (at prices above the release 14 million more acres, yields 20-25 percent price). The reason is that there is still substantial more output, but only a 5 percent lower price, upside price potential, as we know from the upside price potential, as we know from the The paper was not clear on how and why the 1970's when prices rose to twice the loan rate. particular 1970-76 and 1973-79 simulations On the other hand, with farmer-owned reserve were done. That is, are actual data used in the release at 1.45 and 1.75 times the loan rate 1977 Act simulations for 1978-81? Also, target there is less room for speculative storage at price and loan rates are kept the same in all times when price is, say, 1.3 times the loan simulations, so we cannot see what difference rate. But with price at 1.15 times the loan rate, they make. We are thus looking at a narrow farmers could bet that a release price at 1.75 range of policies.
times the loan rate for wheat would make price rise up to that intermediate level faster, or with Generally troublesome is the lack of detail higher probability, under the farmer-owned rein the paper about (a) what the results look serve program. like and (b) what generates the results. For given target and loan prices, varying farmerIn short, one cannot just use an elasticity of owned reserve provisions should affect mostly stock demand, but must respecify the profitstabilization, so one would like to see year-byseeking storage function separately for each govyear effects, with some sort of stochastic results. ernmental storage program. This is a major probThat is, how was the probability distribution of with the approach as presented in this prices affected? And what happens to exports, paper; and I cannot take the results seriously yields, and the livestock sector? The within-year without knowing more about the procedures discussion was quite opaque to me. followed in modeling non-program holding of stocks. On the issue of what generates the results, we see a table of demand and acreage elasticEven if the results hold up, another problem ities, but no specification of equations. That is, of the paper is that some of the general lessons how was acreage control put in the supply drawn at the end are not well tied to the simequations? The best available specifications I ulation results.
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The paper makes a few historical points that convincing story to tell. Not that it is wrong, are dubious or at least not supported by the but one does not get a feel for where some of work presented. One is that the cornerstone of the key conclusions are coming from, which is the 1981 Act is a buffer stock program. Another required for confidence in them. Generally, it is the reasons given for implementation of the seems that a simulation model like this one is farmer-owned reserve. A case can be made that not used to its best advantage in this kind of the program's political survivability, and its ecowork, i.e., estimating the effects of actual past nomic downfall, derived from the use of an programs. The model would be more helpful increased farmer-owned reserves entry price as in obtaining an advance indication of consea method of raising the de facto market support quences of a fairly narrow range of proposed price without raising the loan rate.
policy options, such as alternative target price In summary, this paper does not have a really levels in the 1985 farm bill.
